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SIXTH AMENDMENT-EXTENDING
SIXTH AMENDMENT SPEEDY TRIAL
PROTECTION TO DEFENDANTS
UNAWARE OF THEIR
INDICTMENTS
Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686 (1992)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Doggett v. United States,1 the United States Supreme Court, in
a 5-4 decision, extended Sixth Amendment speedy trial protection
to a defendant unaware of his indictment. Implementing the Barker
v. Wingo2 four-part test for speedy trial claims, Justice Souter's ma-
jority opinion held that the "extraordinary" eight-and-a-half year
delay between the defendant's indictment and arrest presumptively
impaired his defense and therefore violated the Speedy Trial
Clause.3
The Court found that the defendant's inability to prove specific
prejudice did not defeat the speedy trial claim.4 Instead, the major-
ity contended that, whether a defendant has proven prejudice or
not, an extraordinary delay between the indictment and trial com-
promises a trial's reliability, even if in unidentifiable ways.5 Justice
Souter added that in cases involving such an extraordinary delay,
mere negligence in prosecution, not bad faith on the government's
part, was sufficient to bring a cognizable constitutional claim. 6
Justice Thomas, in his dissent, argued that granting relief to a
defendant unaware of an indictment unwisely extended the Sixth
Amendment beyond its intended scope.7 Justice Thomas suggested
that the Sixth Amendment protects liberty interests which, in this
case, were not infringed since the defendant was neither incarcer-
ated for a lengthy period of time nor subject to the anxiety of await-
1 112 S. Ct. 2686 (1992).
2 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
3 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2694.
4 Id. at 2693.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 2695 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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ing trial.8
In a separate dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority
for loosening the requirement of proving actual prejudice in favor
of presumed prejudice.9 Justice O'Connor suggested that pretrial
delay injures the government just as much, if not more, than the
defendant.' 0
This Note examines Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial protection
and argues that the Court reasonably extended the right of the "ac-
cused" under the Sixth Amendment to an individual unaware of an
indictment against him. This Note argues that the Court majority
correctly extended the Sixth Amendment to protect against defense
impairment caused by long delays. Therefore, defendants unaware
of the charges against them can still base a speedy trial claim on the
impairment of their defense, regardless of whether liberty infringe-
ment has occurred.
This Note further argues that the Court majority properly
found that, in cases where lengthy delays occur, the defendant
should not have to prove actual prejudice. The Court failed, how-
ever, to distinguish between extraordinary delays, which foster pre-
sumed prejudice, and shorter delays which do not. Since the Court
left no way for the government to rebut presumptive prejudice
brought about by extraordinary delays, this Note argues that the dis-
tinction is crucial. Furthermore, this Note criticizes the irrebuttable
presumption of prejudice the Court has constructed in lengthy
delays.
Finally, this Note argues that the Court wisely held the govern-
ment to a higher prosecutorial due diligence standard. The Court,
however, did little to explain what the due diligence standard is or
should be. This Note contends that, at the very least, courts should
compel prosecutors to take reasonable steps to notify defendants of
outstanding charges.
II. SixTH AMENDMENT SPEEDY TRIAL BACKGROUND
The Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause provides that "in
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy... trial."" Since only the "accused" falls under the scope
of the Sixth Amendment, the Court has ruled that individuals exper-
iencing prejudicial delay before an official accusation cannot enjoy
8 Id. at 2695-96 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 2694 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
10 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
11 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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speedy trial protection.12 Therefore, the Court has granted Sixth
Amendment protection only to individuals officially accused by
arrest or indictment.' 3 Dismissal of the indictment is the exclusive
remedy for a speedy trial violation.' 4
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial does not incorpo-
rate precise time limits within which prosecutors, once instituting a
criminal prosecution, must complete it. Instead of reading the lan-
guage strictly to forbid any delays, the Supreme Court has decided
that courts should handle defendants' Sixth Amendment Speedy
Trial claims by considering the specific facts of each case.' 5
In Barker v. Wingo, 16 the Supreme Court articulated a four-part
test for reviewing the facts of each case in determining whether
post-accusation delay violates the Speedy Trial Clause. According
to Barker, courts must balance: 1) the length of the delay; 2) the
reason for the delay; 3) whether the defendant promptly asserted
the speedy trial right; and 4) the amount of prejudice suffered.' 7
The Barker court noted that, although each factor was relevant for
consideration, it "regard[ed] none of the four factors.., as either a
necessary or sufficient condition... [T]hey are related factors and
must be considered together with such other circumstances as may
12 See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 311 (1986) (when not subject to
indictment or formal restraint, person not protected under the Sixth Amendment). Fed-
eral and state statutes of limitations protect individuals against prejudicial pre-accusa-
tion delay. In addition, the Court has applied the Due Process Clause in this area to
guarantee the defendant's fair trial. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. See generally WAYNE
R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.3 at 794-98 (2d ed. 1992)
(noting the various statutes and court rules which compliment the Sixth Amendment);
See also United States v. Anagnostou, No. 91-3263, 1992 WL 217090 (7th Cir. Sept. 10,
1992) (due process at issue since pre-indictment delays are not covered under the Sixth
Amendment).
13 See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (Sixth Amendment protec-
tion triggered by "either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints
imposed by arrest and holding to answer for a criminal charge").
14 See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973) ("in light of the policies
which underlie the right to a speedy trial, dismissal must remain the only possible rem-
edy"); See also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, § 12-4.1 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp.
1986) (lists comparable state and federal statutes); For criticisms of this rule, see Anthony
Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L. REv. 525, 535 (1975)
(unless pretrial delay has impaired the accused's defense, "the primary form ofjudicial
relief against denial of a speedy trial should be to expedite the trial, not to abort it").
Due to these concerns, the federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974 has made absolute dis-
charge the discretion of the court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (1988).
15 Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690 (1992). See also Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 523-30 (1972) (rejecting demand-waiver approach); Beavers v. Haubert,
198 U.S. 77, 89 (1905) (speedy trial claims are relative).
16 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
17 Id. at 530-32.
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be relevant." 18
Due to the imprecision of the constitutional standard for
speedy trial claims, Congress enacted the Federal Speedy Trial Act
of 1974 which dictates specific time limits for completing the key
stages of a federal criminal prosecution.' 9 The Speedy Trial Act re-
quires a trial to begin no more than seventy days from the filing of
the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant ap-
pears before an officer of the court in which the charge is pending,
whichever is later.20 In addition to the Speedy Trial Act, state stat-
utes and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contain speedy
trial provisions to prevent post-accusation delays.2 1
Nevertheless, the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment
has remained an important, yet imprecise, measure of protection for
defendants prejudiced by post-accusation delay.
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 22, 1980, a federal grand jury indicted Mark Dog-
gett for conspiring to import and distribute cocaine. 22 Authorities
issued a warrant for his arrest the same day.23 Douglas Driver, the
Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) principal agent investi-
gating the conspiracy, informed the United States Marshal's Service
that the DEA would oversee the apprehension of Doggett and his
accomplices. 24
On March 18, 1980, Driver instructed two law enforcement of-
ficers to arrest Doggett at his parent's home.25 When they arrived at
Doggett's home, however, Doggett's mother informed the officers
that her son had left for Bogota, Columbia, four days earlier.26
Doggett apparently had left, unaware that authorities had indicted
18 Id. at 533.
19 While the constitutional protections are applicable to state and federal offenders,
the Speedy Trial Act governs only federal criminal prosecutions. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-
3174 (1988).
20 Since Doggett was not arraigned, he did not fall under the Speedy Trial Act. See 18
U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (1988). In addition, the Act specifically excludes delay caused by
the absence or unavailability of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3) (1988).
21 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, paras. 103-105(a) (1980 & Supp. 1992); WASH. R. CRIM. P. 3.3(c) (West 1990); See
also FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b) (authorizing dismissal for any "unnecessary delay" by gov-
ernment in presenting charge to grand jury, finding information or bringing defendant
to trial).
22 Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2688 (1992).
23 Doggett v. United States, 906 F.2d 573, 575 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
24 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2688.
25 Id
26 Id.
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him and issued a warrant for his arrest.27
In order to catch Doggett on his return to the United States,
Driver sent word of Doggett's outstanding arrest warrant to United
States Custom's stations and a number of law enforcement organi-
zations. 28 Driver entered a notation in the Treasury Enforcement
Communications System (TECS), a computer network that helps
Customs agents screen people entering the country. 29 After initially
failing to place Doggett on an additional national crime computer
system, Driver eventually entered the information on March 18,
1981.30 In September 1981, Doggett's TECS entry expired, unbe-
knownst to Driver, and Doggett's name vanished from the system.3 '
On September 21, 1981, Agent Williams, in charge of DEA op-
erations in Panama, informed Driver that Panamanian authorities
had arrested Doggett on drug charges. 32 Driver requested informal
expulsion proceedings, but made no attempt to initiate extradition
proceedings because law enforcement officials in the United States
Embassy in Panama told him that the extradition treaty between the
United States and Panama did not cover drug offenses.33 On Octo-
ber 15, 1981, Panama's attorney general agreed to expel Doggett to
the United States once the Panamanian government completed its
prosecution.34 Agent Williams left Panama in July 1982 and re-
ported to Driver that Doggett remained in Panamanian custody.3 5
On July 15, 1982, the Panamanian authorities released Dog-
gett.36 Several cables from the United States embassy in Panama to
the State Department in Washington, D.C. indicated that the United
States was notified of Doggett's release and his plans to return to
Columbia.3 7 This information apparently eluded the DEA.3 8 Dog-
gett proceeded to Columbia, where he lived with his aunt for nearly
three months.39 On September 25, 1982, Doggett returned to the
United States and passed unhindered through U.S. Customs atJohn
F. Kennedy Airport in New York.40
27 Doggett, 906 F.2d at 576.
28 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2688.
29 Id.
30 Doggett, 906 F.2d at 576.
31 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2688.
32 Doggett, 906 F.2d at 576.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2688 (1992).
40 Id.
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From 1982 to 1985, however, Agent Driver continued to be-
lieve that Doggett remained in jail in Panama. 4 I Driver assumed
that Doggett had received a lengthy sentence from the Panamanians
and did not communicate with Agent Williams' successor concern-
ing Doggett's status.42 Only after his own fortuitous assignment to
Panama in 1985 did Driver discover of Doggett's departure to Co-
lumbia.43 Driver, however, made no attempt to track Doggett down
either abroad or in the United States.44
In the meantime, after returning to the United States, Doggett
led a normal, productive and law-abiding life.45 He met his wife in
October 1982 and married her a year later.46 Doggett interacted
openly and freely in the community using his real name and made
no attempt to conceal his identity or whereabouts. 47 He financed
two homes through the bank, possessed credit cards, registered to
vote, filed income tax returns, obtained a driver's license, received
three traffic tickets, earned his associate degree at college and
worked as a computer operations manager.48
Doggett remained lost to the American criminal justice system
until September 1988, when he underwent a credit check pursuant
to a Marshal's office program that checks outstanding warrants.49
Within thirty minutes, the government discovered Doggett's
driver's license number, the make and tag of his car, his wife's name,
his employer and his address. 50 On September 5, 1988, nearly six
years after his return to the United States and eight-and-a-half years
after his indictment, the government arrested Doggett on charges of
conspiring to import and distribute cocaine. 5 1
Doggett moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the gov-
ernment's failure to prosecute him earlier violated his Sixth Amend-
ment right to a speedy trial.52 On December 27, 1988, the
magistrate entered a Report and Recommendation suggesting the
denial of Doggett's motion to dismiss. 53 Relying on Barker, the mag-
41 Doggett v. United States, 906 F.2d 573, 576 (11 th Cir. 1990).
42 Id. at 576-77.
43 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2688.
44 Id.
45 Doggett, 906 F.2d at 577.
46 Id
47 Id
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690 (1992).
52 Id.
53 Id., See also Brief for Petitioner at 6, Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686
(1992) (No. 90-857) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
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istrate found that the delay between Doggett's indictment and arrest
was long enough to be "presumptively prejudicial," and the delay
"clearly [was] attributable to the negligence of the government." 54
The magistrate also found that Doggett had appropriately asserted
his right to a speedy trial since no evidence existed that he had
known of the charges against him until his arrest.55 The magistrate
further found, however, that Doggett made no affirmative showing
that the delay impaired his ability to mount a successful defense or
had otherwise prejudiced him.56 In his recommendation to the dis-
trict court, the magistrate contended that the failure to demonstrate
particular prejudice sufficed to defeat Doggett's speedy trial claim. 57
On January 31, 1989, the district court entered an order deny-
ing Doggett's motion to dismiss the speedy trial claim, accepting the
magistrate's Report and Recommendation. 58 On February 3, 1989,
Doggett entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 11 (a) (2), expressly reserving the right to ap-
peal his ensuing conviction on the speedy trial claim. 59 At sentenc-
ing on March 31, 1989, a trial court found Doggett guilty of a
felony, sentencing him to three years probation and a one thousand
dollar fine.60
Doggett appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. 61 A split panel of the
court of appeals affirmed the conviction. 62 Relying on Ringstaff v.
Howard,63 the appellate court ruled that, absent bad faith by the gov-
ernment, Doggett could prevail only by proving "actual prejudice"
or by establishing that "the first three Barker factors weighed heavily
in his favor." '64
Applying this standard, the Eleventh Circuit majority agreed
with the magistrate that Doggett had not shown actual prejudice.6 5
Attributing the government's delay to "negligence" rather than
"bad faith," 66 the court concluded that Barker's first three factors did
not weigh so heavily against the government so as to make proof of
54 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2690.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.; Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690 (1992).
60 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 53, at 6.
61 Doggett v. United States, 906 F.2d 573 (11 th Cir. 1990).
62 Id. at 582; Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2690.
63 885 F.2d 1542 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
64 Doggett, 906 F.2d at 578-79.
65 Id.
66 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2690.
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specific prejudice unnecessary. 67 In his dissent, Judge Clark argued
that the majority placed an undue emphasis on Doggett's inability to
prove actual prejudice. 68 The Supreme Court granted Doggett's
petition for certiorari. 69
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY
Writing for the majority,70 Justice Souter reversed the decision
of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case. Souter's opinion
upheld the Barker four-part speedy trial claim analysis and balanced
the respective facts of Doggett's case.
In considering the first Barker factor, an uncommonly lengthy
delay, the majority easily found that the eight-and-a-half year delay
"was not customarily prompt.' ' 7 ' The majority presumed that prej-
udice intensifies over time and found that Doggett's delay stretched
beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of
the claim.72
67 Id
68 Id
69 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
70 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2686.Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens and Kennedy joined
Justice Souter's opinion.
71 Id. at 2691. The Barker enquiry ends if a delay does not exist which could presump-
tively cause prejudice. In this way, the length of delay is a triggering mechanism. See
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) ("The length of the delay is to some extent a
triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial,
there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.")
The Supreme Court has still never specifically identified what length of time consti-
tutes presumptive prejudice. See United States v. $8850, 461 U.S. 555, 565 (1983)
("[L]ittle can be said on when a delay becomes presumptively improper"). Lower courts,
however, have repeatedly ruled delays over a year presumptively prejudicial. See, e.g.,
Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Pemberton, 813 F.2d 626, 628 (3d Cir. 1987) (16-month de-
lay); Redd v. Sowders, 809 F.2d 1266, 1269 (6th Cir. 1987) (32-month delay); Ringstaff
v. Howard, 885 F.2d 1542, 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (23-month delay); Davis v. Puckett,
857 F.2d 1035, 1040 (5th Cir. 1988) (13-month delay); United States v. Ashford, 924
F.2d 1416, 1421 (7th Cir. 1991) (18-month delay prejudicial because courts have ruled
that delays as little as twelve months are prejudical); See also Gregory P.N. Joseph, Speedy
Trial Rights in Application, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 623 n.71 (1980) (collection of cases
suggests delay over eight months meets this standard, while a delay of less than five
months does not), cited in Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2691 n.1.
The Court has noted some time periods which do not run as part of a speedy trial
claim. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986); United States v. Marion,
404 U.S. 307 (1971); United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (1982) (if charges are
brought and dismissed only to be instituted again later, the period between the cessation
of one criminal proceeding and the commencement of another is not significant under
the Speedy Trial Clause). See also Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975) (per
curiam) (delay between the identification of a person as a probable criminal and either
the arrest or prosecution of that person is addressed as a matter of due process).
72 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2691 n.1 ("'[P]resumptive prejudice' does not necessarily
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Justice Souter's opinion then considered the second Barker fac-
tor, the reason for the delay before the trial.7 3 The Court was skep-
tical of the government's persistence in tracking down Doggett,
stating that the government made no serious effort to find Doggett
for six years prior to his arrest. 74 While the majority did not believe
the government acted in bad faith, Justice Souter noted that the
government's actions were "findable negligence," which weighed
against its prosecution. 75
Justice Souter also briefly touched upon the third Barker factor,
assertion of the speedy trial claim. Although the government main-
tained that Doggett had not promptly sought his Sixth Amendment
claim, 76 the majority refused to punish Doggett for not invoking his
speedy trial right until after his arrest.77 The majority noted that if
Doggett had known of the charges, this knowledge would have
weighed heavily against Doggett. Doggett, however, was unaware of
the indictment. 78
Justice Souter then addressed the government's principal con-
tention. The government presented two arguments implicating the
fourth Barker factor, amount of prejudice suffered. 79 First, attempt-
ing to limit Barker, the government contended that, outside the pro-
tection of liberty interests, the Speedy Trial Clause was not
generally intended to protect a criminal defendant's fair trial.80
Consequently, according to the government, Doggett was not really
an "accused;" therefore, the Sixth Amendment did not protect him
against having his defense impaired by the government.8 1
The majority refused to honor this argument, which would
indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts
deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry.").
73 Id. at 2691.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Brief for United States at 14, Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686 (1992) (No.
90-857) [hereinafter Brief for United States].
77 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2691.
78 The Court did not appreciate the government's attempt to re-create the facts in
arguing that Doggett actually did know about the indictment. Id. The government ar-
gued that since Doggett's mother had visited him in Panama and his brothers had heard
of the trial of Doggett's co-conspirators, Doggett must have been aware of the indict-
ment. See Brief for United States, supra note 76, at 4, 6, 13. Although the facts were
suspicious, the Court noted that the evidentiary question had been settled below at the
trial level where Doggett had not testified. Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2691.
79 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2692.
80 Brief for United States, supra note 76, at 9-12; Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2692.
81 Brief for United States, supra note 76, at 9-12. The government cited precedent
that a defendant, if not an accused, must establish prejudice before receiving speedy
trial relief. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977); United States v. Marion,
404 U.S. 307 (1971) (protracted delay only violates due process if the government ad-
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"read part of Barker right out of the law."'8 2 Instead, Justice Souter
explained that pretrial prejudice is not merely protected under the
Due Process Clause.8 3 Under the Sixth Amendment, the majority
contended, the speedy trial inquiry must weigh the effects of delay
on the accused's defense, just as it has to weigh any other form of
prejudice that Barker recognized. 4
The second argument raised by the government was that Dog-
gett had not shown how the delay prejudiced him.8 5 Justice Souter
agreed with the prosecution that Doggett's prejudice could only
arise from the possibility that his defense was impaired; he was
neither subjected to pretrial detention nor aware of the charges, an
awareness which could have potentially caused anxiety or
humiliation.8 6
The majority, however, disagreed with the government's con-
tention that Doggett had to show exactly how the delay weakened
his defense. Although the majority conceded that Doggett had
come up short in this respect, Justice Souter noted that "considera-
tion of prejudice is not limited to the specifically demonstrable."8 7
Justice Souter explained that since prejudice is difficult to prove, it is
not essential for defendants to show prejudice in every speedy trial
claim as long as the defendant experienced lengthy delays.88
While the Court would not go so far as to state that presump-
tive prejudice by a long delay carried a Sixth Amendment claim, Jus-
tice Souter noted that mixing other relevant facts with an extensive
delay increases the likelihood of a successful claim.8 9 Excessive de-
lay, the Court reasoned, compromises the reliability of a trial in
ways a defendant cannot prove. 90
Next, Justice Souter considered how large a role the presump-
tive prejudice stemming from Doggett's eight-year delay could play
vances no satisfactory reason for the delay and the defendant experiences actual preju-
dice from the delay).
82 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2692.
83 ME at 2692 n.2 ("We reject the government's argument that the effect of delay on
adjudicative accuracy is exclusively a matter for consideration under the Due Process
Clause.").
84 Id. at 2692. These other forms of prejudice recognized by Barker were pretrial
incarceration and the anxiety and humiliation of awaiting trial after posting bond. See
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1969).
85 Brief for the United States, supra note 76, at 15.
86 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2692.
87 Id.
88 IM. at 2692-93.
89 Id. at 2693.
90 The reliability of a trial is compromised, for example, by witness memory loss or
other loss of evidence. Id.
1993]
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in his speedy trial claim.91 The court looked at three hypothetical
cases. In the first case, where the government pursued Doggett with
reasonable diligence, the majority suggested Doggett's claim would
fail absent specific prejudice. 92 In this hypothetical, the majority as-
sumed the pretrial delay was excusable and justified. In the second
hypothetical, in which the government caused the delay in bad faith,
the majority said that Doggett would surely prevail, especially with
an extensive delay.93
The Court's third hypothetical mirrored Doggett's case, in
which prosecutorial negligence caused the delay in bringing the ac-
cused to trial. 94 In this case, the majority suggested balancing the
Barker factors according to the facts.9 5 Although noting that negli-
gence certainly weighed less heavily against the government than
deliberate bad faith, the majority said, "[I]t still falls on the wrong
side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for
delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun." 96 Due to the
presumption that negligent behavior compounds prejudice over
time, the majority further presumed that evidentiary prejudice
grows .97
In effect, the majority ruled that negligence compounds with
time, even if the accused cannot prove that prejudice exists.
Though the Court hinted that the government could "persuasively
rebut 98 Doggett's contentions, it did not dictate how the govern-
ment could have done so. In fact, the Court merely noted, "[w]hile
the Government ably counters Doggett's efforts to demonstrate par-
ticularized trial prejudice, it has not, and probably could not have, af-
firmatively proved that the delay left his ability to defend himself
unimpaired." 99
In a final policy argument, the majority noted that it was not
willing to punish Doggett for the prosecutor's mistakes and allow
the government to "gamble with the interests of criminal suspects
assigned a low prosecutorial priority."' 100 Instead, the Court dis-
missed Doggett's indictment due to the combination of the govern-
ment's negligence in causing the extraordinary delay and the
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 2694.
99 Id. at 2694 n.4 (emphasis added).
100 Id. at 2693.
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presumption of prejudice stemming from the extensive delay which,
though unproven, was not persuasively rebutted by the
govemment. 01
B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DISSENT
In a short dissent, Justice O'Connor expressed her displeasure
with the majority in allowing speculative prejudice from a delay to
tip the scales in favor of a speedy trial claim.'0 2 O'Connor stated
that the Court has always required a showing of actual prejudice to
the defendant before weighing prejudice in the balance.' 03 Justice
O'Connor noted that Doggett, even with the lengthy delay, did not
suffer any anxiety or restriction of his liberty. 10 4
In addition, Justice O'Connor suggested that delay is a
"double-edged sword," which would hurt the government's prose-
cution just as much as Doggett's defense. 10 5 She reasoned that
since the government had the burden of proving its case beyond a
reasonable doubt, it was even more adversely affected by the delay
than Doggett. 0 6
C. JUSTICE THOMAS' DISSENT
In his dissent, Justice Thomas 0 7 berated the majority for rede-
fining the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause outside of its orig-
inal intent. Justice Thomas stated that the Speedy Trial Clause
exists to protect an accused from undue incarceration and the anxi-
ety and humiliation stemming from public accusation.' 08 Directly
opposing the majority's allegations, Thomas claimed that the Sixth
Amendment was not intended to protect against prejudice to a de-
fendant's defense or later disruptions of a normal life.' 0 9
First, Justice Thomas said that the Sixth Amendment does not
101 Id
102 Id- at 2694 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
103 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
104 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
105 Id. (O'Connor,J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302,
315 (1986)).
106 Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2694 (1992) (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
See also Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 315.
107 Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Thomas' dissent.
108 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2695 (Thomas,J., dissenting). Thomas quoted precedent that
"[Tihe speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarcer-
ation prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of lib-
erty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life
caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.") Id. (quoting United
States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982)).
109 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2695 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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protect against prejudice to the defendant's defense."10 Justice
Thomas did not accept the majority's assertion that "precedent sup-
ports" the fact that the Sixth Amendment protects against defense
prejudice.' Thomas stated that the Speedy Trial Clause is not di-
rected against delay-related prejudice generally but against delay-
related prejudice to a defendant's liberty.112 Justice Thomas said
that "inordinate delay ... may impair a defendant's ability to pres-
ent an effective defense. But the major evils protected against by
the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from actual or possible
prejudice to an accused's defense."" 5
Justice Thomas stressed that the key in analyzing Sixth Amend-
ment Speedy Trial claims has always been to consider prejudice to
an individual's liberty."t 4 He argued that any precedential language
suggesting that defendants need not prove actual prejudice in
speedy trial claims existed because the Court had never foreseen a
case in which such a large delay could occur with the defendant not
suffering any impairment of liberty. 1 5
Justice Thomas suggested that if the Speedy Trial Clause was
aimed at safeguarding against prejudice to the defense, then it
would presumably limit all prosecutions that occur long after the
crime. 16 According to Justice Thomas, defendants prosecuted
years after a crime are just as hampered in defending themselves
whether they "were indicted the week after the crime or the week
before the trial."11 7 Therefore, "It]he initiation of a formal criminal
prosecution is simply irrelevant to whether the defense has been
prejudiced by delay."" 8
Justice Thomas believed Doggett was not an "accused" under
110 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
I1I Id. at 2696 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
112 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting); See also United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312
(1986) ("[T]he Speedy Trial Clause's core concern is impairment of liberty.").
113 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2696 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971)).
114 Id. at 2695-96 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For a background on the history of the
Sixth Amendment, see Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-25 (1967) (describ-
ing the roots of the Speedy Trial Clause in English law).
115 Thomas noted that the precedent case, Moore v. Arizona, cited by the majority for
the contention that prejudice is not necessary in all speedy trial claims, is misleading
since again the Court did not foresee a situation like Doggett's. See Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at
2697 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 27 (1973)
(per curiam)) [emphasis added] ("[P]rejudice is inevitably present in every case to some
extent, for every defendant will either be incarcerated pending trial or on bail subject to
substantial restrictions on his liberty.").
116 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2697 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 2696-97 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 2697 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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the Sixth Amendment since he did not suffer liberty infringement.
Consequently, he could not seek Sixth Amendment protection. 119
Instead of relying on the Sixth Amendment for protection against
prejudice by a long delay, Justice Thomas suggested that Doggett
look to the applicable statute of limitations and the Due Process
Clause, which "always protects defendants against fundamentally
unfair treatment by the government in criminal proceedings."' 120
Second, Justice Thomas discounted any entitlement to relief
under the Speedy Trial Clause due to the disruption of Doggett's
life, an issue which he criticized the majority for not even address-
ing. 121 Thomas said the Sixth Amendment does not protect a right
of repose, a right to remain free from secret or unknown indict-
ments which could later disrupt his new law-abiding life. 122
After looking at common law repugnance to a criminal right to
repose, Justice Thomas again noted that an individual unaware of an
indictment should seek relief under federal and state statutes of lim-
itations: "Such statutes not only protect a defendant from prejudice
to his defense . . . but also balance his interest in repose against
society's interest in the apprehension and punishment of
criminals."' 123 Justice Thomas wrote that "to recognize a constitu-
tional right to repose is to recognize a right to be tried speedily after
the offense," converting the Speedy Trial Clause into a constitu-
tional statute of limitations. 124
Justice Thomas' dissent outlined his fear that, in becoming so
119 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 2698 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See, e.g., United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S.
783 (1977); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971); United States v. Mac-
Donald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982) ("The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is ... not
primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time; that
interest is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by statutes of limita-
tions."); See also Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970) (statutes of limita-
tions are "designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against
charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to
minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past.").
121 The Court had asked for re-argument on this issue. See United States v. Doggett,
112 S. Ct. 631 (1991) (directing the parties to brief the question "whether the history of
the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment supports the view that the Clause
protects a right of citizens to repose, free from the fear of secret or unknown indict-
ments for past crimes, independent of any interest in preventing lengthy pretrial incar-
ceration or prejudice to the case of criminal defendant.").
122 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2699 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
123 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas noted that statute of limitations take into
account the severity of the crime. For example, a graver offense has a much longer
statute of limitations than a minor one. See, e.g., Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal
Law: A Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L. Rav. 630, 652-53 (1954) (comparing
state statutes of limitations for various crimes).
124 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2700 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
19931 817
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
engrossed in applying Barker's four-prong test, the Court had lost
sight of the nature and purposes of the Sixth Amendment's Speedy
Trial Clause and consequently, it opened up new unintended liber-
ties under the clause.1 25 Justice Thomas identified the majority's er-
ror as failing to recognize that "speedy trial guarantees cannot be
violated-and thus Barker does not apply at all-when an accused is
entirely unaware of a pending indictment against him." 126
According to Justice Thomas, pretrial delay and the disruption
of life remain relevant in the speedy trial analysis, but only insofar as
deciding whether a defendant, deprived of a liberty interest pro-
tected under the clause, deserves relief.127 The two factors, how-
ever, are not relevant where no liberty infringement exists since
they exist outside the scope of the Sixth Amendment.128
Like the majority, Justice Thomas ended his opinion with a pol-
icy consideration. Instead of prodding prosecutors to be more dili-
gent, Justice Thomas predicted that the Doggett decision would
actually "transform the courts of the land into boards of law-en-
forcement supervision" with the courts "indulg[ing] in ad hoc and
result-driven second-guess [ing] of the government's investigatory
efforts."' 29
V. ANALYSIS
The Doggett majority correctly granted relief under the Sixth
Amendment Speedy Trial Clause. The Court extended the defini-
tion of "accused" under the Amendment at least to defendants una-
ware of their indictments. In doing so, the Court properly realized
Doggett's potential defense impairment after an eight-and-a-half
year delay, which occurred largely due to government negligence.
The Court, however, did not note whether their decision affects the
due process requirements of actual prejudice in the pre-indictment
stage. Extending the Speedy Trial Clause, and therefore the Barker
test, to the pre-indictment stage of the criminal process would seem
reasonable since defense impairment occurs during delays at all
stages in the prosecution.
125 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
126 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 2700 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
128 Thomas noted that the delay between the indictment and trial probably even
helped Doggett as evidenced by his sentence of only a $1000 fine and three years proba-
tion. Id. at 2701 n.6 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he delay gave Doggett the opportu-
nity to prove what most defendants can only promise: that he no longer posed a threat
to society. There can be little doubt that, had he been tried immediately after his co-
caine-importation activities, he would have received a harsher sentence.").
129 Id. at 2700-01 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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The Barker balancing test, upheld by the court, provides a help-
ful, ad-hoc basis for lower courts to analyze the respective factors
crucial in determining whether a speedy trial violation has occurred.
The Court's application of the Barker test to lengthy delays such as
in Doggett, however, has some flaws. First, the Court failed to specify
what constitutes an "extraordinary" delay, which allows a defendant
to allege presumptive prejudice. Similarly, the Court did not dis-
cuss how the government in cases of extraordinary delay could re-
but the presumption of prejudice. By not suggesting a standard by
which the government could rebut a defendant's presumptive preju-
dice, the Court seemingly imposed an irrebuttable presumption of
prejudice for lengthy delays caused in any part by the prosecution.
The Court also appropriately ruled that, where the government
fails to use diligence in apprehending a defendant, the delay weighs
against the prosecution. The Court, however, failed to specify this
minimum level of prosecutorial due diligence. This Note argues
that the Court should have imposed on the government an obliga-
tion to notify the defendant of the charges. Then, by failing to exer-
cise reasonable efforts to notify the defendant, courts could hold the
prosecution to a higher standard without indulging in an ad-hoc
grading of prosecutors' efforts.
A. WAS DOGGETr AN "ACCUSED"?
The Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause protects the "ac-
cused" from long delays in prosecution. 3 0 Historically, an individ-
ual not subject to arrest or indictment cannot enjoy Sixth
Amendment protection.'3 1 Before arrest or indictment, the Court
interprets the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, along with
state and federal statutes of limitations, to protect defendants
against prejudice stemming from long delays between a crime and
formal accusation. 132
Whether or not an individual is an "accused" under the Sixth
Amendment affects the evidentiary burden and, therefore, also
likely dictates the result. "Accused" individuals receive protection
130 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
131 See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (Sixth Amendment protec-
tion triggered by "either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints
imposed by arrest and holding to answer for a criminal charge . . ."). See also United
States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 311 (1986) (when not subject to indictment or for-
mal restraint, person not protected under the Sixth Amendment).
132 See, e.g., United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1977); Marion, 404 U.S. at
325-26 (Due Process Clause may provide basis for dismissing indictment if the defend-
ant can show at trial that prosecutorial delay before the indictment was filed prejudiced
the right to a fair trial).
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under the Sixth Amendment speedy trial four-part balancing test
laid out in Barker. An individual not deemed accused, however,
must rely on the Due Process Clause. 133 The Court has required
defendants relying on the Due Process Clause to present concrete
evidence showing material harm and prosecutorial bad intent, in-
stead of merely engaging in the balancing test.134 "Accused" indi-
viduals, therefore, have a lower burden of proving that harm
occurred due to the prosecution's delay.
The majority and dissent in Doggett disagreed whether Doggett
was in fact an "accused" entitled to relief under the Sixth Amend-
ment. Justice Thomas noted in his dissent that an accused typically
suffers liberty infringement as a result of the delay.' 3 5 Doggett,
however, did not endure pretrial incarceration, nor did he suffer hu-
miliation and anxiety while awaiting trial, prejudices normally pro-
tected against under the Sixth Amendment. Instead, for much of
the period after the indictment, Doggett lived a normal life in Vir-
ginia, unaware of the charges. 13 6 Since the delay did not explicitly
inconvenience Doggett, Justice Thomas' dissent argued that Dog-
gett did not merit Sixth Amendment protection.
Although Doggett did not suffer actual harm to his liberty, the
majority correctly protected against Doggett's probable defense im-
pairment due to the delay. The Court did so by holding that the
government's filing of the indictment initiated Doggett's Sixth
Amendment protection as an accused, regardless of his knowledge
of the charges.' 37 The Court stated that once receiving the indict-
ment, passage of time impaired Doggett's defense.138 Therefore,
once the prosecution files an indictment, courts should continue to
hold the government responsible for diligently arresting defendants
and granting expeditious trials. 139
Justice Thomas' dissent, however, argued that the indicted indi-
vidual who has not suffered liberty infringement cannot enjoy Sixth
133 U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
i34 See, e.g., Marion, 404 U.S. at 324 (allowing for dismissal under the Due Process
Clause "if it were shown at trial that the pre-indictment delay in this case caused sub-
stantial prejudice to the defendant's rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an inten-
tional device of government to gain advantage over the accused"); Acha v. United
States, 910 F.2d 28, 32 (Ist Cir. 1990).
135 United States v. Doggett, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2695-96 (1992) (Thomas,J., dissenting)
(suggesting that in analyzing Sixth Amendment speedy trial claims, courts should look at
the effects on the defendant's liberty).
136 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 53, at 3.
137 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2692.
138 Id. at 2693 ("[E]xcessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial
in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify.").
139 See infra notes 191-201 and accompanying text.
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Amendment protection. He assumed that the only reason previous
cases had not made this explicit was because no one had ever envi-
sioned a fact pattern where such a long delay could occur between
the indictment and arrest of an unaware individual.1 40 This fact,
however, is not a reason to reverse the decision. Simply put, the
Court has repeatedly stated that an individual becomes "accused"
once indicted. 4 1
In addition, the Court's purpose of protecting against defense
impairment also comports with precedent. Justice Souter stated,
"[o]nce triggered by . . . indictment . . . the speedy trial enquiry
must weigh the effect of delay on the accused's defense just as it has
to weigh any other form of prejudice that Barker recognized."1 42
The Court has long recognized defense impairment as "the most
serious" protection of the Sixth Amendment since it "skews the fair-
ness" of the trial.143 Memory lapses and the loss of both witnesses
and evidence, which all damage a defendant's defense, occur with
delay, whether or not the defendant is aware of the indictment. 44
Since defense impairment compounds with time after the crime
regardless of when or whether an indictment is filed, Justice Thomas
failed to see why indicting an individual allows the person to be "ac-
cused" if the person did not suffer liberty infringement. 45 Justice
Thomas reasoned that prejudice due to defense impairment grows
with time after a crime regardless of when or whether the govern-
ment files an indictment. 46
Under Justice Thomas' reasoning, however, defense impair-
ment does not merit Sixth Amendment protection. According to
Justice Thomas, Doggett could not enjoy Sixth Amendment protec-
tion since he was ignorant of the indicted charges and not "ac-
140 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2697 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
141 See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1982) (Sixth Amendment
speedy trial right attaches when formal criminal charges instituted and prosecution be-
gins); United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 311 (1986); United States v. Marion,
404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (Sixth Amendment protection triggered by "either a formal
indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to
answer for a criminal charge. . ."); See also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE, § 12-
2.2(a) (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986) ("[T]he time for trial should commence running...
from the date the charge is filed . .
142 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2692.
143 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
144 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2692-93 (suggesting that time erodes exculpatory evidence
and testimony).
145 Id. at 2697 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 2696 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[P]rejudice to the defense stems from the
interval between crime and trial which is quite distinct from the interval between accusa-
tion and trial.").
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cused."' 147 At that moment, however, Doggett would also not
qualify for protection under the presiding statute of limitation 148 or
the Due Process Clause, 149 both of which guard against delay before
formal accusation. Therefore, under Justice Thomas' reasoning,
Doggett would not qualify for any defense impairment protection,
regardless of the length of delay before his trial.
The Court majority correctly interpreted the definition of an
accused to protect an indicted defendant unaware of the accusation
and solely concerned about defense impairment. Allowing protec-
tion for defense impairment, however, threatens to tear apart the
Court's distinction between pre- and post-indictment delay and its
subsequent reliance on separate constitutional amendments. De-
fense impairment, after all, really exists at any time after the crimi-
nal act regardless whether or not an indictment has been filed.' 50
An inherent discrepancy exists in granting Doggett Sixth Amend-
ment protection merely by being indicted without realizing it.
The Court likely only intended to extend speedy trial protec-
tion to defendants unaware of pending charges. Once the Court
stresses defense impairment by granting Sixth Amendment protec-
tion to someone unaware of charges, however, it is uncertain why
courts should deny this important protection to others concerned
about having his or her defense impaired.' 5 '
147 Id. at 2700 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[S]peedy trial guarantee cannot be violated
... when an accused is entirely unaware of a pending indictment.").
148 Under statutes of limitations, protection ends with the filing of an indictment. See
18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1988) ("[E]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person
shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment
is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall
have been committed.").
149 See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971) (Due Process Clause re-
quires dismissal of indictment if pre-indictment delay caused substantial prejudice to
defendant).
150 See Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2696 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (defense impairment exists
whether or not formal charges are implemented).
151 For example, some commentators have suggested that potential defendants not
yet charged should receive speedy trial guarantees since they also need to prepare their
case and are affected by long pretrial delays. See, e.g., NoteJustice Overdue: Speedy Trialfor
the Potential Defendant, 5 STAN. L. REV. 95, 100 (1952) (potential defendants' ability to
prepare an adequate defense rests upon the same critical factors whether accused or
not); See also Phyllis Goldfarb, When Judges Abandon Analogy: The Problem of Delay in Com-
mencing Criminal Prosecutions, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 607, 628-38 (1990) (arguing that
construing the Speedy Trial Clause to exclude pre-accusation delay is not an accurate
interpretation "[b]ecause delay can occur at any stage of the criminal process, from of-
fense to conviction, the purposes of the speedy trial would seem to be served fully only
by limiting undue delay at whatever point in the process it occurs."); Allyn Z. Lite, The
Pre-Accusation Delay Dilemma, 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 539, 543 (1980) ("[T]he prejudice
which a criminal defendant actually suffers from unreasonable prosecutorial delay
before trial is the same regardless of the stage of the pre-trial proceedings during which
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If the Court moves away from distinguishing between pre- and
post-indictment delay, individuals at all stages in the criminal pro-
cess, previously only offered protection under the strict "show
harm" requirements of the Fifth Amendment, could fall under the
more lenient Sixth Amendment Barker test.1 52 Since the Barker bal-
ancing test meticulously analyzes the facts of each case, the Court
could streamline doctrinal baggage, while protecting defense im-
pairment in all phases of a trial where speedy trial is at issue, by
implementing the Barker test for all speedy trial claims.1 53
B. THE PREJUDICE FACTOR
The fourth Barker factor in analyzing a speedy trial claim consid-
ers the amount of prejudice placed on the defendant due to the de-
lay in the proceedings.1 54 Although the Supreme Court, prior to
Doggett, had stated that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice to
a defense was not a prerequisite to affording speedy trial relief,155
it was occasioned."); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE, supra note 14, § 12-2.2(a)
("Indeed, if the uncharged defendant is compared with a defendant who knows he or
she is charged but is not brought to trial promptly thereafter, the former may be at an
even greater disadvantage because the defendant is not prompted to prepare his or her
defense.").
152 The notion that pre-indicted defendants have speedy trial interests has received
some acknowledgement from the Court. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 328 (Douglas, J., con-
curring) ("The right to a speedy trial is the right to be brought to trial speedily which
would seem to be as relevant to pre-indictment delays as it is to post-indictment de-
lays"); See also United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 318 (1986) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) ("We have ... recognized that one may stand publicly accused without being
under indictment."). However, pre- and post-accusation delay remain protected under
two different balancing tests and two different constitutional amendments. Short of a
complete overhaul of the existing speedy trial guarantees, it is more likely the Doggett
decision will remain limited to protecting defendants unaware of pending indictments
from defense impairment. At least one circuit court has recently noticed the tightrope
the Supreme Court is drawing in trying to distinguish pre- and post-indictment defense
impairment protection. See United States v. Anagnostou, No. 91-3263, 1992 WL
217090, at *3 n.2 (7th Cir. Sept. 10, 1992) (ruling that Doggett's holding does not upset
longstanding requirements that defendants prove actual prejudice under the Due Pro-
cess Clause); See also Pharm v. Hatcher, No. 90-3539, 1993 WL 8193, at *3 n.5 (7th Cir.
Jan. 19, 1993) (adopting Anagnostou's view that Doggett did not change the standards for
pre-accusation delay).
153 Due to the interest in protecting against all pretrial delay and the lack of any
clearly developed test for pre-accusation delay, lower courts have already used the Barker
balancing test in pre-indictment settings. See, e.g., United States v. Barker, 530 F.2d 189
(8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Shaw, 555 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Stoddart, 574 F.2d 1050 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670 (9th Cir.
1977).
154 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
155 See Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 (1973); See also Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 ("We
regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or sufficient condi-
tion to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.").
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lower courts generally required some showing of prejudice.' 56
Believing a showing of prejudice was necessary to pursue his
speedy trial claim, Doggett attempted to prove that several events
occurred during the long delay which prejudiced his trial.' 57 The
defense noted that seventeen tape-recorded conversations, a gov-
ernment informant and a material witness-all relevant to Doggett's
prosecution-had disappeared.158 The defense summed up the
prejudice by alleging, "Doggett's delayed arrest completely dis-
rupted his life, drained his financial resources, interfered with his
liberty and may well have actually interfered with his ability to pres-
ent a defense."1 59
To rebut these arguments by the defense, the government al-
leged that Doggett's prejudice claims were purely speculative.' 60
The government suggested that the tape recordings, made in the
course of the government's undercover investigation, would most
likely have confirmed Doggett's guilt. 16' The government further
noted that Doggett's presumed prejudice due to the long delay
should receive little merit.' 62
The Doggett majority never mentioned the missing tapes or wit-
nesses, but instead noted that "consideration of prejudice is not lim-
ited to the specifically demonstrable."' 163 The Court decided that
because an extraordinary delay occurred due to government negli-
gence, a presumption of prejudice existed.' 64 Doggett, therefore,
did not have to prove prejudice. Although lower courts, prior to
Doggett, had not assumed defendants suffered prejudice due to de-
lays, ' 65 the majority in Doggett found that, in an "extraordinary" de-
156 See, e.g., Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Burmingham, 788 F.2d 933, 936 (3d Cir. 1986)
(prejudice is key factor, absence of prejudice decisive); Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249,
256 (10th Cir. 1986) (great reluctance to find speedy trial violation absent prejudice);
United States v. DeClue, 899 F.2d 1465, 1471 (6th Cir. 1990) (defendant must show
"substantial prejudice"); United States v. Juarez-Fierro, 935 F.2d 672, 676 (5th Cir.
1991) (defendant made no attempt to show impairment by delay; this is the "most im-
portant inquiry"); Rayborn v. Scully, 858 F.2d 84, 94 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 842 (1989). But see Eleventh Circuit rule that in absence of actual prejudice, speedy
trial claim affirmed if other three Barker factors all weigh heavily against the government.
United States v. Dennard, 722 F.2d 1510, 1513-14 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Davenport, 935 F.2d 1223, 1239 (11th Cir. 1991); Ringstaffv. Howard, 885 F.2d 1542,
1545 (11th Cir. 1989).
157 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 53, at 6.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 11.
160 Brief for the United States, supra note 76, at 15-18.
161 Id. at 16.
162 Id. at 15-18.
163 United States v. Doggett, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2692 (1992).
164 Id. at 2693.
165 Courts, for example, tended not to assume memory lapse occurred. See, e.g.,
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lay, this presumptive prejudice exists.1 66
Although the majority assumed Doggett's prejudice, it did not
contradict precedent. The Barker Court noted that prejudice caused
by defense impairment is the most difficult type of prejudice to
prove because time erodes evidence and testimony. 167 Therefore,
the Doggett Court reasoned that, in an eight-and-a-half year delay,
prejudice surely exists, even if defendants cannot prove its
existence. 168
In her separate dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the major-
ity's reliance on presumptive prejudice. Justice O'Connor sug-
gested that the delay prejudiced the government more than Doggett
since the government would have a much more difficult time prov-
ing its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 169 Similarly, Justice
Thomas' dissent noted that the delay undoubtedly helped Doggett
by reducing his sentence.' 70
United States v. Brock, 782 F.2d 1442, 1447 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. DeClue,
899 F.2d 1465, 1470-71 (6th Cir. 1990). Nor did courts find prejudice when defendants
offered vague conclusory allegations. See, e.g., United States v. Rein, 848 F.2d 777, 781
(7th Cir. 1988) ("vague allegations" of difficulty finding employment, mental problems,
deprivation of motor vehicle use and possible lapses of memory insufficient to prove
prejudice); United States v.Juarez-Fierro, 935 F.2d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 1991) (conclusory
statements alone, of anxiety suffered from delay, insufficient to support constitutional
challenge).
166 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2693.
167 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972); See also United States v. Brown, 520
F.2d 1106, 1111-12 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (personal prejudice found where defendant lost
contact with some or all potential witnesses); United States v. Re, 335 F. Supp. 1176
(S.D. N.Y. 1972) (prejudice may arise from deterioration of health and advancing age
during delay interim); United States v. Rogers, 781 F. Supp. 1181, 1189-90 (S.D. Miss.
1991) (prejudice found due to impaired cognitive functions which caused defendant to
be unable to meaningfully assist in his defense).
168 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2693. See generally United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 328-
29 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Regina v. Robins, 1 Cox's C.C. 114 (Som-
erset Winter Assizes (1844)):
It is monstrous to put a man on his trial after such a lapse of time. How can he
account for conduct so far back? If you accuse a man of a crime the next day, he
may be enabled to bring forward his servant and family to say where he was and
what he was about at the time; but if the charge be not preferred for a year or more,
how can he clear himself? No man's life would be safe if such a prosecution were
permitted. It would be very unjust to put him on his trial.
169 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2694 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also Barker, 407 U.S. at
521 (noting that the Court has long noted that speedy trial claims are especially confus-
ing since "pre-trial delay, the danger against which the right is designed to protect,
often works to the advantage of a criminal defendant, particularly one who is not con-
fined while awaiting trial."); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 326 (C.K.
Ogden ed., 1931) ("[i]t is desirable that punishment should follow offense as closely as
possible; for its impression upon the minds of men is weakened by distance, and, be-
sides, distance adds to the uncertainty of punishment, by affording new chances of
escape.").
170 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2701 n.6 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Although both dissents may have correctly assumed that delay
could have also prejudiced the government, they cannot refute that
the Bill of Rights protects individuals instead of the government.' 7 '
The Sixth Amendment should not protect the government from de-
lays caused by poor prosecution techniques or from losing exculpa-
tory evidence; instead, it should protect defendants from prejudice
arising from these delays. 172 Therefore, the dissent fails to note that
Doggett may have received an undeserving conviction altogether.
1. Lack of Standard for Determining Extraordinary Delays
The Court correctly inferred presumptive prejudice due to
Doggett's extraordinary delay caused by government negligence.173
The Court failed, however, to distinguish between "extraordinary"
delays that foster this presumed prejudice and regular delays that
do not. 174 The majority merely noted that, when performing the
Barker test, the longer the delay, the greater the presumption of
prejudice. 175
Whether or not an extraordinary delay exists, however, greatly
affects which party has the burden of showing the existence of preju-
dice.' 76 When no extraordinary delay exists, courts will not pre-
sume prejudice, 77 so that the defendant still has the burden of
171 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 13, § 2.1 ("Bill of Rights... designed to ensure that
the federal government did not overstep its authority and deny the rights of the individ-
ual."); See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992) (Bill of Rights
served as protection for individuals from unjustified interference by the government).
172 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 13, § 2.8(e) (constitutional guarantee paramount re-
gardless of the practical costs or efficiency of the criminal process).
173 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2693 (suggesting that court's toleration of government negli-
gence should vary "inversely with its protractedness.").
174 The Court only mentions that the delay is "extraordinary." Id. at 2694; See also
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972) (five-year delay "extraordinary").
'75 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2693 ("[T]he weight we assign to official negligence com-
pounds over time as the presumption of evidentiary prejudice grows."). The majority
likely did not mention any specific time frame for fear that the time limit would begin to
appear like the constitutional statute of limitations, which the dissent accused the major-
ity of installing instead of the Barker balancing test.
176 Commentators have noted that the party holding the burden of proving prejudice
may dictate the result of the case. See generally Survey, Right To a Speedy Trial, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 164, 170-71 (1972) (the party with the burden rarely
prevails because it is so difficult to establish actual prejudice).
177 For example, in a post-Doggett case, the Second Circuit dismissed a Sixth Amend-
ment speedy trial claim after the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice from the
seven-month delay between the indictment and trial. Though the court acknowledged
the Doggett Court's determination that failure to show prejudice is not necessarily fatal to
a speedy trial inquiry, the court distinguished the case since the delay was only seven
months and not due to government negligence, so much as the complexity of the case.
United States v. Vassell, No. 92-1045, 1992 WL 183226 (2d Cir. Aug. 3, 1992).
The Doggett majority, in finding prejudice, did perhaps skirt one of the major issues,
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establishing prejudice. 178
On the other hand, in an extraordinary delay, a presumption of
prejudice automatically exists due to the length of the delay.' 79 In-
stead of making the defendant prove actual harm, the government
has the burden of rebutting a presumption of prejudice. 180 Thus,
whether the delay is extraordinary is crucial in affecting the burden
of proof. The Court, though, failed to specify a means of determin-
ing when a delay is extraordinary. 181
To protect itself from criticism and give guidance to lower
courts, the Court should have installed the applicable statute of limi-
tations as the time frame where courts can imply presumptive preju-
dice after the indictment is filed. 182 The Court has already noted
that "these statutes provide predictability by specifying a limit be-
yond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant's
right to a fair trial would be prejudiced."'' 8 3 Since statutes of limita-
tions are fostered to "minimize the danger of official punishment
because of acts in the far-distant past," their time limits should ap-
ply to accused defendants similarly prejudiced by poor prosecu-
tion. 84 In this case, where the applicable statute of limitations was
namely how large a role prejudice plays when the delay is not extraordinary. Lower
courts have been in disarray as to whether a requirement of actual prejudice exists in
asserting a speedy trial claim. See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text. The
Court could have upheld the Eleventh Circuit test and said that, since the other three
factors weigh against the government, a Sixth Amendment violation occurred. The
Court, however, chose not to comment on the Eleventh Circuit test, addressing the pre-
sumption of prejudice due to the long delay.
178 See Recent Case, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 26 VAND. L. REv. 171, 173 (1973) (de-
fendant generally has the burden of showing actual prejudice).
179 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2693-94; See also United States v. Shell, No. 91-30206, 1992
WL 214048 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 1992) (post-Doggett case which found six-year delay meant
defendant did not have to prove prejudice).
180 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2694.
181 For a similar criticism, see H. Richard Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a
Fast Shuffle, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1376, 1394 (1972) ("[T]he [Barker] Court should have
identified a point at which prejudice is presumed, shifting the critical burden to the state
to prove the negative.").
182 This suggestion was formulated in Doggett's Supreme Court brief:
Where the defendant lacks knowledge of the indictment and the statute of limita-
tions has expired from the date of indictment to the date of arrest, actual prejudice
should be presumed... [T]his time frame, which would have given the government
five years from the indictment in this case, is very generous to the Government, can
be easily ascertained by all concerned, and follows a closely analogous time frame
established by Congress.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 53, at 13.
183 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971).
184 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970) (statute of limitations are
"designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when
the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the
danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past.").
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five years, the Court could properly assume that Doggett suffered
prejudice due to the eight-year delay between the indictment and
trial.18 5
2. Failure to Define Rebuttable Presumption of Prejudice
In addition to its failure to establish the length of an extraordi-
nary delay, which shifts the burden of proving a constitutional viola-
tion, the Doggett majority also failed to explain how the government
could have rebutted Doggett's presumptive prejudice. Justice Sou-
ter's opinion indicated that the government had not persuasively re-
butted Doggett's prejudice, but it did not state how the government
could have rebutted this unsubstantiated prejudice. 18 6 In fact, the
Court suggested that the government probably could not have done
so.' 8 7 Under the Court's nebulous reasoning, a delay that fosters
presumed prejudice appears irrebuttable.
In an "extraordinary" delay, therefore, the government appar-
ently cannot rebut presumptive prejudice.'8 8 For example, in a
post-Doggett case, the Ninth Circuit held that a six-year delay vio-
lated the Speedy Trial Clause even though the defendant conceded
that most of the essential witnesses and documentary evidence were
still available. 18 9 The Ninth Circuit, while quoting from Doggett that
the government can "persuasively rebut" the presumption of preju-
dice, merely noted that the government had not done so in this
case.' 90 Therefore, once a court has found an "extraordinary" de-
lay, the prosecution cannot rebut presumptive prejudice and loses.
The Doggett majority correctly found that a long delay is apt to
impair an individual's defense. At the very least, however, the Court
needs to distinguish between extraordinary delays and other delays.
185 See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1988) (applicable federal statute of limitations stating fed-
eral authorities must file charges within five years after the offense unless otherwise
noted).
186 Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2693 (1992).
187 Id. at 2693 n.4 ("[W]hile the government ably counters Doggett's efforts to
demonstrate particularized trial prejudice, it has not, and probably could not have, af-
firmatively proved that the delay left his ability to defend himself unimpaired"); See also
Uviller, supra note 181, at 1394-95 (cited in Doggett at 2693 n. 4) (suggesting that rebut-
ting this presumption of prejudice is extremely difficult "since the critical facts are
known only to the defendant.").
188 In this way, an "irrebuttable presumption of prejudice" is, for all intents and pur-
poses, a statute of limitations. The Court has built a statute of limitations around its
nebulous "extraordinary delay."
189 United States v. Shell, No. 91-30206, 1992 WL 214048, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 8,
1992).
190 Id. ("Although the Court [in Doggett] did not define precisely what type of evidence
must be shown to rebut the presumption, we have little doubt that the government has
failed to meet its burden.").
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In addition, where an extraordinary delay exists, the Court should
enunciate what the government must show in order to rebut preju-
dice. In the absence of such a standard, extraordinary delay be-
comes an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice.
C. PROSECUTORIAL IMPLICATIONS
Under the second Barker prong, courts must consider the prose-
cutor's and defendant's respective reasons for the delay in the pro-
ceedings.19' Since an "extraordinary" delay presumptively
prejudices defendants, the Doggett decision places a heightened bur-
den on the prosecution to limit post-indictment delay. The Court,
however, did not properly specify these prosecutorial duties of dili-
gence.' 92 The majority described the diligence duty only by stating
that the DEA "made no serious effort" to determine if Doggett had
returned to the United States.' 93 This "findable negligence," cou-
pled with the lengthy delay, tipped the Barker balancing test in Dog-
gett's favor.194
After Doggett, the impact of diligence and negligence by the
prosecution remains uncertain. The Court has previously stated
that the government has a constitutional duty to make a diligent
good-faith effort to bring indicted defendants to trial without unnec-
essary delay.' 9 5 Following United States v. Loud Hawk,' 96 lower courts
limited this requirement, ruling that, absent bad faith, the govern-
ment is not largely accountable for delays due to gathering materials
for trial,' 97 limited prosecutorial resources'98 and crowded court
191 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972).
192 The Court has recognized the vague area defining prosecutorial duties:
The duty which the Sixth Amendment places on government officials to proceed
expeditiously with criminal prosecution would have little meaning if those officials
could determine when that duty was to commence... [Ilt is precisely because [the
speedy trial right] is relative that we should draw the line so as not to condone
illegitimate delays whether at the pre- or the post-indictment stage.
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 331-32 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
193 Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2691 (1992).
194 Id.
195 See Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383 (1969); See also Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S.
30, 37-38 (1970) ("Although a great many accused persons seek to put off the confron-
tation as long as possible, the right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is funda-
mental and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt trial.").
196 474 U.S. 302, 316 (1986) (Supreme Court declined to hold the government re-
sponsible for delay attributable to the government's interlocutory appeal.).
197 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2693; See also United States v. Vassell, No. 92-1045, 1992 WL
183226 (2d Cir. Aug. 3, 1992) (no Sixth Amendment violation due to government's
delay in collecting accomplice defendant for plea bargain).
198 See, e.g., Davis v. Puckett, 857 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1988) (shortage of prosecutorial
staff is a neutral and non-prejudicial reason that should weigh less heavily against the
government).
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dockets.199
In addition, courts have found that defendants similarly possess
a duty to limit pretrial delays. Although the Supreme Court has not
explicitly stated so, lower courts often hold that missing defendants
have waived their rights to a speedy trial. 200 Some lower courts,
however, have recently placed a higher burden on the government
in its effort to locate and apprehend missing defendants. 20 ' Courts,
though, have never held law enforcement officials to "heroic ef-
forts" in apprehending defendants purposefully avoiding apprehen-
sion or fleeing to unknown parts. 20 2
Doggett presented a different scenario-a missing defendant
who was not fleeing prosecution. The Court correctly held the
prosecution in this case to a higher standard to apprehend Dog-
gett.20 3 If the government actively pursues a missing defendant,
thus meeting the higher standard, the ensuing delay should not run
199 See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 436 (1973) ("Unintentional delays
caused by overcrowded court dockets or understaffed prosecutors are among the factors
to be weighed less heavily than intentional delay . . ."); Gov't of Virgin Islands v.
Burmingham, 788 F.2d 933, 937 (3d Cir. 1986) (delay due to crowded docket and terri-
torial courts desire to seek clarification of law not weighed strongly against the govern-
ment); See also Note, The Right To a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 858
(1957) (the Speedy Trial Clause protects against bad faith of the prosecution, not
against court delay).
200 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 782 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1986) (government not
faulted for 39-month delay when defendant used fake identification, possessed no tele-
phone and did not pay taxes); United States v. Mitchell, 957 F.2d 465, 469 (7th Cir.
1992) (government not faulted for delay after defendant fled to Columbia where he was
incarcerated); United States v. Perez-Cestero, 737 F. Supp. 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (gov-
ernment not responsible for eight-and-a-half year period after defendant jumped bail
and fled to Venezuela). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1988) (federal crime to travel in inter-
state or foreign commerce with the intent to avoid prosecution).
201 The Second Circuit has broadly read the good-faith effort to bring a defendant to
trial. See United States v. Diacolios, 837 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1988) (the government is
not only charged with the burden of bringing the criminal defendant to trial but is also
obligated to exercise due diligence in attempting to locate and apprehend the defend-
ant, even if he is a fugitive fleeing prosecution). See also Rayborn v. Scully, 858 F.2d 84,
90 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1032 (1989); United States v. Deleon, 710 F.2d
1218, 1221 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bagga, 782 F.2d 1541, 1543 (lth Cir.
1986) (citing Smith v. Hooey which established that the government has an affirmative
obligation to locate and apprehend a known suspect). For a criticism of the expansion
of prosecutorial due diligence to apprehend fugitives, see Bruce A. Green, 'Hare and
Hounds:' The Fugitive Defendant's Constitutional Right To Be Pursued, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 439
(1990) (Green argues that the Second Circuit in Diacolios abandoned precedent in hold-
ing that a fugitive may hold the prosecution partially responsible for the delay if the
prosecution did not diligently attempt to apprehend him.).
202 See, e.g., Rayborn, 858 F.2d at 90; Diacolios, 837 F.2d at 83 ("due diligence ... does
not require government to pursue that which is futile"); Bagga, 782 F.2d at 1543; Deleon,
710 F.2d at 1221-22.
203 Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2694 (1992).
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as part of a defendant's speedy trial claim.204 If, however, the prose-
cution does not actively seek the defendant, the delay should serve
as part of a defendant's speedy trial claim. Therefore, prosecutors
must actively seek out all defendants whom they have indicted. 20 5
The dissent, however, would not compel prosecutors to actively
seek out people unaware of their indictments. 20 6 Thus, under the
dissent's formulation, the government has no incentive to quickly
arrest individuals unaware of charges. The prosecution could indict
individuals sporadically, prosecuting at will, regardless of any conse-
quences from time delay. Therefore, so long as the government in-
dicted a person within the applicable statute of limitations, the
dissent seemingly would uphold the conviction of the defendant un-
aware of an indictment many years later. On the contrary, courts
should require the prosecution to diligently seek defendants under
protections granted by the Sixth Amendment. 20 7
Doggett, which holds prosecutors to higher standards, may con-
tinue to shift the burden on the prosecution to limit delays after
filing an indictment. For example, in United States v. Shell, a post-
Doggett case, the Ninth Circuit held the prosecution negligent, even
though the defendant had earlier fled to another country under an
alias. 208 The court found that the government misplaced the de-
fendant's files for five years after locating him.20 9 This holding mir-
rored Justice Souter's assertion in Doggett that merely because a
204 The Federal Speedy Trial Act follows a similar procedure. The Act specifically
excludes delay caused by the absence or unavailability of the defendant. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(3)(a) (1988). Seealso United States v. Nash, 946 F.2d 679, 680 (9th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Garrett, 720 F.2d 705, 707-08 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1037 (1984) (holding that "absence or unavailability" of a defendant occurs 1) when the
defendant's whereabouts are unknown due to an attempt to avoid apprehension or pros-
ecution, or when the defendant's whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence,
or 2) when the defendant's whereabouts are known, but presence at trial cannot be ob-
tained by due diligence, or defendant resists appearing at or being returned for trial).
205 Of course, one way in which prosecutors can alleviate the burden of actively seek-
ing out indicted defendants is to know where the individuals are before filing the indict-
ment. Then, provided the authorities file the indictment within the applicable statute of
limitations, the prosecution conceivably can quickly locate the individual.
206 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2700 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (speedy trial guarantee cannot
be violated when accused is unaware of a pending indictment).
207 See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrIONAL LAW 4-5 (2d ed. 1988)
(Bill of Rights needed to supplement implied limits on government for protection of
individual rights).
208 United States v. Shell, No. 91-30206, 1992 WL 214048 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 1992).
209 Id. at * 1 ("Five years delay attributable to the government's mishandling of Shell's
file, like the eight year delay in Doggett, creates a strong presumption of prejudice."). See
also United States v. Shelton, No. 90-00140, 1992 WL 357501 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 23, 1992)
(defendant's indictment dismissed after two-year delay where no attempt was made to
apprehend defendant who had not hidden himself from law enforcement authorities).
19931
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
defendant is a low priority does not mean his or her Sixth Amend-
ment protection lessens. 210
On the same day the Court decided Doggett, it also granted cer-
tiorari and remanded Aguirre v. United States, another Sixth Amend-
ment speedy trial case.2 1' This decision may further define the
Court's prosecutorial due diligence expectations. In Aguirre, the
Ninth Circuit found a five-year delay between indictment and trial
presumptively prejudicial but excusable since the delay resulted
from the government's inability through diligent efforts to locate
the defendant.21 2 Therefore, the court ruled against the defend-
ant's speedy trial claim.
The Supreme Court, however, remanded the case in light of the
Doggett decision.213 The Court likely believed that the prosecution
in Aguirre did not actively seek the defendant. 214 After the govern-
ment issued the indictment, they failed to contact Aguirre's family
or lawyer.215 The government only placed "stops" in various com-
puter systems and then forgot about the matter for five years. 216
Like Doggett, Aguirre returned to the United States and lived
openly, never assuming a false identity.2 1 7 Aguirre held several
jobs, including one with the state's department of revenue where he
was fingerprinted, licensed and cleared for security.2 18
The Aguirre case, therefore, presents another fact pattern to
help decipher government prosecutorial duties. However, the dili-
gence standard that the Court intends the lower courts to follow
under the second Barker prong is still unclear. The Supreme Court
obviously wants to give courts discretion to use the Barker balancing
test, yet balancing inherently places the courts in a position of ad
210 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2693 ("Condoning prolonged and unjustifiable delays in
prosecution would both penalize many defendants for the state's fault and simply en-
courage the government to gamble with the interests of criminal suspects assigned a low
prosecutorial priority.").
211 Aguirre v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 3021 (1992).
212 Aguirre v. United States, No. 89-50265 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished disposition
available on WESTLAW).
213 Aguirre, 112 S. Ct. 3021 (1992). As in Doggett, the government did not show that
Aguirre had knowledge of any formal indictment against him. Aguirre, however, also
had not proven any prejudice to his defense, except for a key witness who said he was
having trouble remembering the events from over six years ago.
214 Aguirre, No. 89-50265, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. 1991) (Pregerson, J., dissenting)
("[G]overnment's attempts to locate Aguirre while he was living this open lifestyle were
feeble, at best.").
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 2.
218 Id.
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hoc second-guessing prosecutors' actions.219
In light of the confusing standards, the Court should have insti-
tuted a notice requirement on the prosecution under the second
prong of the Barker test. This notice requirement would help clarify
which party is accountable for different periods of pretrial but post-
indictment delay.220 In the absence of a reasonable attempt to no-
tify the defendant, the reason for the delay would weigh heavily
against the prosecution. 22 1 The prosecution should incur punish-
ment for not allowing defendants the opportunity to compile a de-
fense at the most beneficial time, especially since it is so easy to take
reasonable steps to notify the defendant.222 Once the defendant re-
ceives notice, however, he or she then holds the burden of reducing
the trial delay. If, after notice, the defendant evades arrest, any later
actions should weigh heavily against the speedy trial claim. 223
A notice requirement also could explain clearly the govern-
ment's prosecutorial faults in the Supreme Court's cases. In Doggett,
for example, the prosecution failed to exercise reasonable diligence
219 See Doggett, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2700-01 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
220 Federal courts have used similar notice requirements with regard to sealed indict-
ments. One district court recently held that the sealing of an indictment while awaiting a
second indictment did not justify a 13-month delay. Since the indictment was sealed and
the defendant was not aware of it, the government bore the burden of justifying the
delay. United States v. Rogers, 781 F. Supp. 1181, 1186 (S.D. Miss. 1991). Similarly,
another court stated that sealed indictments place the burden to bring a defendant's
case to trial squarely on the government. United States v. Shelton, No. 90-00140, 1992
WL 357501, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 23, 1992).
221 Some factors which would show reasonable attempts to notify include: 1) periodic
attempts to locate defendant at last known place of residence and employment, 2) peri-
odic interviews with defendant's friends and family, 3) periodic requests for foreign
assistance, 4) periodic placement of defendant's name on various crime computers and
5) periodic reviews of defendant's telephone and employment records. See United States
v. McGeough, No. 82-00327, 1992 WL 390234 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1992) (government not
deemed negligent after ten-year delay in which it repeatedly attempted to notify defend-
ant of charges).
222 See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 334 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("[T]he crucial question in determining the legitimacy of government delay may be
whether it might reasonably have been avoided-whether it was unnecessary."). See also
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE, supra note 14, § 12-2.2 ("If the defendant is not
arrested or otherwise notified of the charge, the defendant is not prompted to seek out
witnesses on his or her behalf when they might be available."); See also Rost v. Municipal
Court, 184 Cal. App. 2d 507, 512 (1960):
The Constitutional requirement of a trial requires that a defendant be served with a
warrant of arrest within a reasonable time after the filing of the complaint. Thereby
he would be given notice of the fact that a charge has been made against him at a
time when witnesses in his behalf, if any there be, are available.
Id.
223 In these cases, the defendant could be said to have "implied notice" whereby the
speedy trial right has most likely been waived. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying
text.
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in notifying Doggett of the indictment. 224 The DEA waited twenty-
six days after filing the indictment to arrest him at his parent's
home.225 Second, even when the DEA knew Doggett was in jail in
Panama, the DEA failed to notify him of the indictment. 226 Finally,
the government failed for six years to perform a cursory check to
ascertain whether Doggett had returned to the United States, a
check which would have led immediately to Doggett's discovery. 227
Similarly, in Aguirre, the prosecution failed to take reasonable
steps to notify the defendant of the pending indictment. Although
Aguirre was in contact with the American Embassy in London, he
was not made aware of the indictment. 228 In addition, the prosecu-
tion failed to notify either Aguirre's family or lawyer.229 Finally, the
government, once again, did not attempt to check if he had returned
to the United States. 230
A notice requirement would also satisfy the policy arguments
raised by both the Doggett majority and dissent. On one hand, the
notice requirement would satisfy the Court's desire to encourage
prosecutors to actively seek out defendants. 23 ' Courts would also
hold prosecutors to similar standards for all defendants, so that no
defendant would engender less Sixth Amendment protection.
On the other hand, notice requirements would not "transform
the courts into boards of law-enforcement supervision," thus satisfy-
ing the dissent's policy concern.23 2 The courts would simply assess
whether prosecutors had reasonably attempted notice. Little need
would exist for the court to second-guess any of the prosecution's
other actions. Once the government met this standard, courts
would not find negligence under the second Barker prong.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Doggett majority correctly granted relief under the Sixth
224 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 53, at 14.
225 United States v. Doggett, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2688 (1992) (Doggett indicted on Feb.
22, 1980, and DEA attempted to apprehend him Mar. 18, 1980.).
226 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 53, at 14.
227 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2691.
228 Aguirre v. United States, No. 89-50265, slip. op. at 2 (9th Cir. 1991) (Pregerson,
J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 3.
230 The accused living openly in the jurisdiction should surely weigh heavily against
the prosecution's due diligence. See, e.g., People v. Serio, 13 Misc. 2d 973 (1958) (state
had not followed due diligence when defendant lived openly in jurisdiction, had name
listed in telephone directory, was employed by a well-known firm and had appeared in
the local courts on other matters).
231 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2693-94.
232 Id. at 2700-01 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Amendment Speedy Trial Clause because of the defense impair-
ment caused by delays. In doing so, the Court extended the defini-
tion of "accused" under the Amendment, at least to defendants
unaware of charges against them. The Court, however, did not
mention whether their decision affects the due process require-
ments of actual prejudice in the pre-indictment stage. Extending
the Speedy Trial Clause, and therefore the Barker test, to the pre-
indictment stage of the criminal process would seem reasonable
since defense impairment due to delay occurs at all stages of the
prosecution.
The Barker balancing test, upheld by the Court, provides a help-
ful ad-hoc basis for lower courts to analyze crucial factors in decid-
ing whether a speedy trial violation has occurred. The Court's
application of the Barker test to lengthy delays in Doggett, however,
has some flaws. First, the Court did not distinguish between ex-
traordinary and normal delays. Since the Court stated that ex-
traordinary delays contain a built-in presumption of prejudice which
the prosecution apparently cannot rebut, this distinction is crucial.
In failing to mention how the prosecution could rebut prejudice
caused by extraordinary delays, the Court has unnecessarily imple-
mented an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice for long delays
caused in any part by the prosecution.
Although the Court mentioned that prosecutors must follow a
higher standard in bringing missing defendants to trial, the Court
did not specify this due diligence standard. The Court should have
compelled prosecutors to take reasonable steps to notify defendants
of outstanding charges. In this way, defendants would maintain
their constitutional right to a speedy trial without placing the courts
in the position of second-guessing a prosecutor's performance.
STEVEN M. WERNIKOFF
1993] 835
